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1031 Tax Exchanges and Nebraska’s Farm Real Estate Market
Yr
Ago

Market Report

4 Wks
Ago

6/3/05

Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight . . . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb . . . . .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feeder Pigs, National Direct
45 lbs, FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass,
51-52% Lean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, Ch. & Pr., 90-160 lbs.,
Shorn, Midwest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout,
FOB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

$90.14

$90.14

$84.70

133.26

143.48

*

116.97

116.15

*

150.43

162.00

146.13

74.29

79.07

66.05

45.60

64.22

50.70

79.63

74.35

66.36

97.50

107.25

111.00

232.12

254.74

254.98

3.75

2.90

2.96

2.93

1.82

1.92

8.59

6.38

6.62

4.70

2.82

2.96

1.68

1.62

1.64

115.00

115.00

115.00

62.50

62.50

62.50

57.50

57.50

57.50

Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Omaha, bu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grain Sorghum, No. 2, Yellow
Columbus, cwt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, MN , bu . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hay
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Northeast Nebraska, ton . . . . . . . . . . .

* No market.

“The 1031's are giving us a distorted
value of farmland.”
The above quote from a Southeastern Nebraska
reporter to this department’s 2005 Nebraska Farm Real
Estate Survey, to be released July 1, reflects many of the
comments made by reporters from across the state. The
1031 exchanges appear to be increasingly influential in
local agricultural land markets from Chadron to Falls City.
This year, for the first time in the series of monitoring
factors influencing the value of agricultural land, the
categories of non-farm investors and 1031 Tax Exchanges
were ranked by our survey respondents as the two most
influential factors behind the recent rise of land values.
Given it’s influence, it’s important to understand fully
just what this federal tax provision is and how it might be
impacting real estate market dynamics. In this article we are
presenting an overview of the 1031 exchange process;
followed by a hypothetical example to illustrate how it can
impact agricultural land values. Finally, we draw some
implications regarding this tax provision.
The 1031 Tax Exchange in the federal tax code refers
to provisions for tax deferral of capital gains taxes due on
the sale of real estate property. If a real estate property has
been owned for at least two years, the seller of that property has the opportunity to postpone to a later time any
capital gains taxes owed upon sale of that property, so long
as the individual reinvests in other real estate property
within a specified time period. As currently structured, this
provision allows for different types and combinations of
income-producing real estate property to be used (for
example, capital gains from sale of an apartment building
deferred by purchase of farmland), so long as the “exchange” property is identified within 45 days of the sale of
the original property and closing on the exchange property
occurs within 180 days. For most individuals, the federal
tax rate will be 15 percent of the total capital gains. At this
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rate, plus the state-level individual income tax assigned to
the capital gains, the automatic deferral via the 1031 route
can result in very sizable tax savings in the short-run.
To illustrate, consider the following hypothetical
example. Assume a land owner sells 80 acres of Cass
County Nebraska farmland to a land developer for $5,000
per acre (total sale price of $400,000), with the basis value
of the property at $1,200 per acre ($96,000). The difference
between the sale value and the basis value is the calculated
capital gains which is $304,000. At the 15 percent capital
gains federal tax rate plus the 7 percent Nebraska individual tax rate on the capital gains earnings, the total tax
amount of the transaction would total $66,880 ($304,000 x
22 percent).
Now suppose the seller is able to find a 160-acre
replaceable farmland property a few counties farther away
from the original property for $2,500 per acre (reinvesting
the full $400,000 sales proceeds from the first sale). He/she
is now able to defer the full tax obligation of $66,880
($45,600 of capital gains taxes plus the state individual
income tax on those gains of $21,280).
Given the dollar magnitude of this tax deferral option
it is easy to see why individuals may be quite willing to bid
aggressively for an exchange property to execute this
process. And that aggressive nature will only amplify by (1)
limited numbers of properties on the market, and (2) time
running out on the 45-day identification period. In fact, the
reasoning might be that one would be willing to bid up the
specific tract’s value far beyond the $2,500 per acre level.
In order to execute the tax exchange option to defer nearly
$67,000 of taxes (essentially the same as an interest free
loan from the government), this individual might well be
willing, if necessary, to bid up the price of this exchange
property by as much as $418 per acre. Or in other words,
when all of the other normal market factors have been fully
integrated into a bid price on this particular property, this
potential capital gains tax deferment could engage further
rounds of higher bid levels that could result in a further 17
percent price increase per acre for this exchange property.
Of course, the relative magnitude of the “bidding-up”
effect is both a function of the dollar amount of the total
taxes being deferred and the relative relationship of that
dollar amount to the going market value of the exchange
property. It is possible that buyer competition in the form
of 1031 investors could rachet up real estate prices in a
local market to an even greater magnitude than in the
example above.
So what are the implications of 1031 Tax Exchanges in
the agricultural land markets? There are several, but we
will comment on two of them. First, from the individual
taxpayer perspective, one cannot emphasize enough that the
1031 exchange mechanism is merely a capital gains tax

deferral and NOT an automatic tax forgiveness mechanism.
Ultimately, at some future point in time, liquidation of the
real estate will occur and capital gains taxes will come due
(under certain circumstances and sophisticated tax management, some may avoid payment, but these cases are more
likely the exception than the rule). Moreover, it is entirely
possible that when that time arrives, the taxpayer could face
an even higher percentage rate of tax obligation than the
current rate. Or, alternatively, the exchange property’s price
may have been bid upward beyond a sustainable value, and
therefore economic losses are incurred. Consequently,
those who exercise this option should use it with caution.
Second, from a market dynamic perspective, there is
little doubt that this tax mechanism is currently creating
some agricultural land market distortion. Tax-motivated
investor buyers can be setting market bid levels that may
not be economically sound. Competing potential buyers
find themselves either needing to pay more than what they
can economically justify, or simply being forced out of the
market entirely. Given enough of this type of influence, a
point could be reached where a major downward market
value adjustment could occur which spills over on all
property owners.
One of the basic principles of sound tax policy is tax
efficiency – the aspect of how a particular tax may affect
economic activity. Taxes “– that disturb market decisions
the least are more efficient taxes.”1 On this basis, we would
have to conclude the 1031 Tax Exchange mechanism needs
a critical review.
1

Shaffer, Ron, Steve Deller and Dave Marcouiller. Community
Economics: Linking Theory and Practice, 2nd Edition. Blackwell
Publishing, 2004.

Bruce Johnson, (402) 472-1794
Professor, Dept. of Agricultural Economics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Aaron Raymond, Graduate Research Assistant
Dept. of Agricultural Economics
University of Nebraska-Lincoln

